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TOP SECRET

TICOM/I-202

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INTERROGATION OF MIN. RAT VIKTOR WENDLAND OF
OKW./CHI.

Attached is the report on the interrogation of Min. Rat. Viktor WENDLAND, Deputy Head of Gruppe B of OKW/Chi, carried out by Mr. K.L. BERRIN of L.S.I.C. and by Lieutenant Mary C. LANE of A.S.A. Europe, at BERLIN on 23rd and 24th September, 1946.

2. Appendices containing descriptions of (A) The Hungarian Crypto Bureau, and (B) The Solution of a Yugoslav Diplomatic Recyphering System, are attached to the report.

Ticom
26th November, 1946.

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TOP SECRET

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF MIN. R.A.T. VIKTOR WENDLAND, DEPUTY
HEAD OF GROUP B OF OKM/CHI, AT BERLIN ON 23RD AND 24TH
SEPTEMBER, 1946, BY LIEUT. MARY C. LANE AND MR. K.L. TERRIN.

WENDLAND was discharged by the U.S. Army shortly after the end of the war at LANDSHUT, in Bavaria, together with FENNER, RAFFEL, ROTTER and v. KALKSTEIN. Since then, he has been working at the Centralbiologische Anstalt in Berlin, and has heard about the movements of several of his old colleagues. He stated that between 10th and 14th September, FRITZ MENZER had stayed at his flat in Berlin, and had then returned to his job as teacher at a Gewerbeschule somewhere between LEITZIG and CHEMNITZ. WENDLAND had been away at that time, but MENZER had been entertained by Frau WENDLAND, who was called in to corroborate her husband's statement on this matter. They maintained that MENZER had not given them his address, but that he hoped to visit them again before long. He was described as very tall (190), fairly thin, brown hair, no spectacles, extremely intelligent and very pleasant. There was no difficulty in obtaining permission from the Russians to visit BERLIN. Brown eyes, clean-shaven, strong Saxon dialect.

WENDLAND gave the following locations of OKM personnel :-

MENZER. Teacher at a Gewerbeschule between LEITZIG and CHEMNITZ.
RAFFEL, Franz Karl. Works at the Magistrate in KIEL.
BALLOVIC. Recently taken prisoner by the Russians. Old address: WIEN IX/71, Spitalgasse 31/19.
MUELLER, Hellmuth. Lübeck, Packenburger Allee 21.
LOCKER. Feldkirch, Giesingen, Vorarlberg, Torkelgasse 9.
LOKYS. Halle/Saale, Geiststrasse 50.
KLEINERT. Assistant at Göttingen University.
SCHULZ, Helmut. AHNBEY, Sterup (near Flensburg), P.O. No. 24.
ROHM. Berlin/Zehlendorf, Am Heidehof 52.
WEISSER. Bruckmühl, Bavaria, nr. Bad Aibling.
WALTER, Frä. Flat in BERLIN/ZEHLENDORF, Sunitelsteig 6. Probably in Bavaria at present.
SCHLINZICK. Friedenau, Cecilienärten 2.
SEIFFERT. Vienna, Fasanenstrasse 40.
ADLER and TESSMAR in Munich.
FRANZ. Frankfurt University.
FENNER. Straubing.

with FRICK
He also knew that HUETTENHAIN had been taken to London/in 1945 and returned to the British zone in 1946; he hoped to hear from him before long. Von KALKSTEIN may be in SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

Asked how he knew all this information, WENDLAND was rather vague; he had heard from LOKYS about the movements of FRANZ. It appears that he may be acting as post-office for the OKM/Chi organisation, and it is hoped to make arrangements for all his mail to be censored.

He is of the dreamy professor type, and manages to give the impression that he is telling the truth.

Relations with other countries.

WENDLAND's own experience was confined to the Hungarians and Italians, and he could give no details of liaison with Finland and Japan, although he knew of the presence of Major HAYASHI. He could also say a little about the Austrian organisation.

Please turn over

Austria.

OKW had had liaison with the Austrian bureau since about 1925 and after the Anschluss in 1938 they took over SEIFFERT, BAILOVIC, Dr. MAULER and Dr. LOCKER. He believes that FIGL, the head of the Austrian organisation, is still alive; FIGL wrote a book about the history of the Austrian Chi-stelle, the first part of which was published but the second part suppressed by the Germans, as it contained matter of a nature too secret to divulge. SEIFFERT was the best man in the Austrian organisation, and indeed WENDLAND considered him the best in OKW/Chi.

Hungary.

WENDLAND spent 10 days with the Hungarian organisation at the Old Castle in Budapest in 1944, and wrote a description of their organisation as far as he knew it (see Appendix A). He stated that the Hungarians were very good on Turkish and Bulgarian codes, and believed that they dealt only with diplomatic material. They had never worked on German cyphers, but he believes that the Austrians had done so, he does not know with what success. There was no division of labour between OKW and the Hungarians, but all their results were shared. He does not know when the section was dissolved, but thinks they may have finished up in Bavaria. There was a constant courier service between OKW/Chi and BUDAPEST.

Finland.

He knew that HALLAMMA was very clever, and had been the first to solve the American strip system. He did not know him personally and referred us to FENNER for further details. The Finnish bureau was formed in 1924-25, and did very good work. The heads of OKW/Chi often visited Helsinki.

Czechoslovakia.

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, FENNER and others went to Prague and visited the Czech organisation. The Czechs said they had read some German military cyphers, including Enigma on the old system. FENNER invited them to join OKW/Chi, but they all declined. He does not know any details of their successes and methods.

Italy.

OKW exchanged material and results with the Italians each week on Yugoslav, French, English and possibly American. They dealt with General GAMBA or with a Colonel whose exact name he had forgotten (he thought (KO....IC). After the fall of MUSSOLINI, this Colonel had taken over from GAMBA, and the liaison was unofficially broken off. Whereas OKW trusted the Finns and never tried to break their cyphers, they continued to work on Italian cyphers in spite of the liaison.

Japan.

FENNER had a close liaison with HIYASHI, and OKW gave the Japanese American and English keys, including part of the strip system.

Relations with other German Bureaux.

Some members of OKW had gone over to the Forschungsamt in 1933 - MAETZEL, SEIFFERT, SCHROEDER, WENZEL, v. REZNICZIK (now dead), WAECHTER (lived in Tempelhof, Attilastrasse), SCHLIER. They had tried to persuade WENDLAND to join, but he had refused. BAILOVIC was sent to the Forschungsamt against his will in 1938, but managed to transfer to OKW the

following year. SCHROEDER and WAECHTER were the most efficient of these men. SCHROEDER had examined Enigma in 1932-33 and worked out the period of the machine; he was a very nice man, but a Nazi. Waechter was head of the Anglo-U.S. section and METZEL of the French section.

WENDLAND considered that the Forschungsamt surpassed OKW in the breaking of South American codes - Brazil, Argentine, etc.

There was very little liaison with the Forschungsamt, owing to general hostility. He thought that the Forschungsamt might have had some connection with the Hungarian Chi-stelle, because, when he was returning from BUDAPEST, he met SEIFFERT of the Forschungsamt (not to be confused with the OKW SEIFFERT), and discovered that he had been visiting the Hungarian Abwehr. SEIFFERT was probably in charge of the technical signals matters, and OKW was afraid that the Forschungsamt might be planning to seize the Hungarian section. The hostility between OKW and the Forschungsamt was especially political; the Forschungsamt people were all Nazis, whereas in OKW nobody ever said "Heil Hitler" and they were not slow to criticise the party.

They had practically no contact with OKH, owing to personal antagonisms, and no results were exchanged. WENDLAND did not know anybody in OKH, but he heard that they were successful in breaking military Yugoslav traffic. The original division of OKW and OKH into two separate departments was the work of v. KORNACKY, who was later taken prisoner at STALINGRAD. He thought that FENNER might know details of OKH successes with Anglo-American systems.

The liaison with the Foreign Office was much closer, and all results were exchanged between them. After the bombing of OKW in 1943, the Foreign Office was able to supply WENDLAND with the original copy of his Yugoslav codebook - previously he had worked from a photographic copy. OKW and the Foreign Office gave copies of captured material to all other departments, and also to the Finns, Hungarians, etc.

IRSCHKE (now a violinist in MURBURG or GOETTINGEN) was very clever. OKW contributed to the A.A. research papers, but he never saw the results; he thought that FENNER may have received copies. All V.N.S. and reports went to the A.A. and he himself had instructed Dr. KRUMMEL, before he joined their section. LANGLOTZ was in charge of A.A. cyphers, and as far as he knows is still alive.

No other departments dealt with diplomatic codes, and there was therefore very little liaison; he knew that the Luftwaffe and probably the Marine worked on meteorological traffic, but could give no names or details.

OKW had some liaison with a special police section in Berlin which was concerned with secret inks, and sometimes they received criminal letters; there was never more than one of each kind, and they therefore had no success. He does not know the names of anybody in this organisation.

He knew nothing of liaison with the Waffen SS, but believed that they worked in hand with the Forschungsamt.

OKW personalities:

WENDLAND gave the following chronological list of the heads of OKW/Chi :-

BUSCHENLAGEN	1919-1925 or 26.
Major SCHMIDT	1926-1929
Major FELIGIEBEL	1929-1932
Major OSCHMANN	1932-1934 or 35.
Oberst BOETZEL	1935-1939
Oberst KEMPF	1939-1943
Oberst KETTLER	1943-1945.

OSCHMANN became a P/W camp inspector and was killed on the West Front in January 1945.

BUSCHENLAGEN was head of the army in Rumania in 1944, and is now in captivity with the Russians.

The following members of OKW/Chi went to Spain during the civil war :-

Dr. MULLER
 IJDERSEN (killed in an air raid)
 Dr. SCHOLLN
 DUEMELMANN
 Reg. Rat. KIEFER
 HODERLEIN
 CRULL.

This section formed an Aussonstelle, and he thought it probable that this station had remained in Spain after the end of the civil war. Some OKW people flew to Spain during the war, and occasionally WENDLAND received Yugoslav intercepts from Spain. He believed that all African traffic was intercepted there.

Asked for his opinion on FENNER, WENDLAND said that he got on quite well with him, but that nobody took him very seriously. FENNER was against everything, against the Party, against other forms of Government. He was not very clever, and most of his work was administrative. He was generally disliked, and people thought him hysterical. He was too quick in making decisions and passing judgment. Both FENNER and WENDLAND got into trouble for opposing the Party, and it was only through the intervention of FELLGIEBEL and THIELE that they were saved. He did not think, however, that the Gestapo played any part in OKW or that they had any secret agents there. FENNER knew most of what went on in OKW/Chi, and HUETTENHAIN certainly knew everything.

Reichskriegsministerium.

The Reichswehrministerium became the Reichskriegsministerium in 1934 or 1935, but no change of organisation was involved.

OKW archives, etc.

WENDLAND confirmed that his group's documents had been destroyed at WERFEN; another section went to IRIEN on the OHEMSEE, and he thinks that MENZER's material should either be there or near FLENSBURG. Some of their baggage was deposited at HEUFELD, near BAD AIBLING.

OKW/Chi had a fine library of cryptanalytic works, which was burned during the raid in November 1943; the only books to escape were some which were out on loan. Until that time, they made no use of the Foreign Office library. After the raid, Dr. SCHAEDEL spent a considerable time among the Foreign Office archives and rebuilt the OKW library. These books were taken to LAUF, and thence to IRIEN, where they were thrown into the lake. The man in charge of this operation was a Lt. Colonel whose name he does not remember, who took over from KETTLER in the last days of the war. All unused captured material was sent to the Reichsarchive in POTSDAM.

Captured documents.

OKW had captured copies of French and Italian codebooks, and before 1933 they were given the chance of buying the Italian diplomatic code. He was unable to give any details. He thought they might have received American codes from HALLAMA. The Foreign Office obtained a copy of the Yugoslav book on which WENDLAND was working after the fall of Yugoslavia. He knew that a Hagelin machine was captured, probably Swedish, but said that HUETTENHAIN and MENZER would know more about captured machines. He never heard of any English cypher machines being captured, and thought that ROHEN would know about captured British tables.

Hollerith.

WENDLAND stated categorically that OKW had a large Hollerith section of its own, under the charge of HUETTENHAIN and MENZER. He thought that the cryptanalytic aids had gone to IRIEN, but he never saw them or made any use of them. Some of the Hollerith machinery may have remained in BERLIN. He believed that the Foreign Office also had a Hollerith section; HUETTENHAIN had mentioned KRUG in this connection.

V.Ns.

The "verlaessliche Nachrichten" had been distributed to Marine, Luftwaffe and Foreign Office; he did not know whether JODL had given them to OKH, but said that JODL complained that OKW only included bad news and accused them of being defeatist.

Agents' Cyphers.

He knew that BAILOVIC had worked on Yugoslav and Italian agents' systems, he did not know with what success. He thought that Italian agents' traffic was only read when the keys had been captured. VAUCK would know about British agents, also Dr. KLEINERT, who worked under him.

Examination of German Enigma.

At first, WENDLAND said that HUETTENHAIN had 100 men working on the solution of foreign machines, but later it appeared that these included the section working on German systems, and PRANZ's section of 6 or 7 men working on American strip. SCHROEDER first made an examination of German Enigma in 1932-33, before he transferred to the Forschungsamt. Later, MENZER took up this work and the Enigma was improved on his suggestion by the use of additional stecker. WENDLAND was not very sure of his method of approach, but knew that he had punched letters on many thousands of cards, not unlike those used in Hollerith, and had then worked out mathematical formulae by comparing the letters which appeared on the different cards. This examination was carried out purely on grounds of cryptanalytic security, and it was only afterwards that their fears were confirmed when they discovered that the Czechs had succeeded in breaking into the Enigma.

WENDLAND knew nothing about the development of Secret Teleprinters, and said that the whole work of this section was outside his sphere. He knew very little about the Schlüsselschiebe and thought it was about the size of a typewriter.

Work on other Machines.

Asked whether MENZER had tried to apply his methods to the machines of other countries, WENDLAND became much more vague. He stated generally that all machines including Hagelin were unbreakable. Both OKW and the Foreign Office had investigated the Swedish Hagelin, and came to the conclusion that nothing could be done with it. They had also investigated a Russian machine about 1933. He had never heard of the Americans using Hagelin. Asked what other countries used Enigma, he said vaguely that the Japanese might have used it; he declared that he had never heard of its being broken. He did not remember whether they had done any work on French machines. He had never heard of Typex, (but nevertheless wrote the word down without any hesitation, as if he were quite familiar with it). Asked what he considered to be MENZER's greatest cryptanalytic success, he again became vague and said that it was the investigation of German Enigma. Pressed to give an opinion on his offensive successes, he said that he had had none; nevertheless, he stated definitely that OKW was by far the most expert bureau on all machine problems.

Work on Diplomatic Systems: Czech.

WENDLAND was the first to solve the Czech military system before the war, which was a short periodic substitution. Later they turned to transposition, and finally to double transposition, which was considered unbreakable. Nobody in OKW/Chi ever succeeded in solving double transposition in practice; he himself had tried, but without success. They never read the pre-war Czech diplomatic cypher, and during the war he was not aware that any traffic had been received.

Polish. One of their greatest successes was the solution of the subtractor system in use during the war between LONDON and WARSAW. This was the only Polish system of which he knew, and the only pure subtractor system which he knew to have been broken by OKW/Chi. The work was done by SEIFFERT and WITT.

British. He never heard of any British subtractor being solved. They read plain English codes, including a system called "R6". SCHULZ might be able to give details of these systems. The British never repeated their subtractors, and there were thus no repeats on which to work. He had heard of traffic with prefix INTER, but knew nothing of the work done on it; ROHMEN might know more.

Russian. The Russians used exclusively one-time systems for their diplomatic traffic, and there was therefore no Russian section in OKW/Chi. He knew that OKH solved some Russian military systems.

American. He had heard that some strip had been broken by FRANZ and SCHULZ. He thought that the greatest success of OKW/Chi was the reading of the reports from the Military Attache in Cairo, which were of the greatest importance to ROMMEL. He was not sure what system was involved, but thought that it might be strip.

Swiss. PEDERSEN was the head of the Swiss section, and he had solved the Swiss "Sprungcaesar" - a system in which the substitution alphabet changed at varying intervals throughout the text, and the key for these changes altered daily.

French. Most of the French codes which they solved were plain codes. There was a system in use at the beginning of the war, in which the text was recyphered by bigram tables, leaving every fifth figure unrecyphered.



He believed that this system again appeared in 1945. He did not know whether any de Gaulle cyphers were solved, but knew that SCHAUFFLER worked on these in the Foreign Office.

Italian. They worked on Italian cyphers with success throughout the war; the system was similar to the old Jugoslav method of bigram substitution tables, and they were considerably aided by limitations in the basic book. He did not know whether the Vittoria cypher was broken, and was sure that Impero was never read. They worked on the Badoglio cyphers, but without success; the systems were improved, there was not much traffic, and it was no longer considered of much importance. TESSMAR could say more about this.

Greek. Greek exile diplomatic traffic was read; SEIFFERT learnt Greek for the purpose and then succeeded in breaking the code.

Japanese. WEBER had succeeded in breaking the Japanese diplomatic transposition, and results had been exchanged with the Foreign Office.

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Jugoslav. WENDLAND was head of the Yugoslav section, and was able to give a more detailed description of work on Yugoslav diplomatic traffic (exile government only). He knew nothing about TITO cyphers, and thought that BAILOVIC should know about MILILOVIC. Up to 1935, the code-book was recyphered by ordinary bigram substitution tables, afterwards the bigrams were taken from adjacent groups and the groups were transposed within themselves. WENDLAND was asked to write a full description of the solution of this system. (See Appendix B), based on a paper he had written called "Die Lösung eines unbekanntes Codes; überschlüsselt mit Verzählung".

WENDLAND has returned to his work at the Centralbiologische Anstalt, and it was learnt at the end of the interrogation that he also acts as interpreter between his employers and the Russians. He expressed his willingness to answer any further questions, but was anxious that the Russians should not learn of his war-time activities. His address is Berlin/Oehringen, Schillerstrasse 73.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX A.

DESCRIPTION OF THE HUNGARIAN SECTION.

Head: Major General IETRIKOVIC.

Colonel HAROMY (Jugoslavian section)
Colonel NAGY-SEGHY (Bulgarian section)
Col.-lieut. VARGA (?Italian, Greek).

Altogether about 35 - 50 men.

They occupied themselves above all with the Eastern peoples: Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Rumania, Italy. Less stress was laid on French, English and American systems. The interceptors (Funker) were very good. The Hungarians used for this purpose blind men. Especially successful they were in Bulgarian.

For the last time of the war, the Hungarian Chi Section was evacuated to Steinamanger. It may be that this section has come to Germany.

I know that there was a connection between the Finnish and Hungarian Chi Section. I believe that in war time General Ietrikovic made a voyage to Finland. The Chi-section was installed in the castle of Budapest: Szinhaz utca.

The heads of the Hungarian Chi-section:

General KABINA from 1924 - 1931/32?

General-lieut. IOKORNY 1932/33? - 1938/39?

(IOKORNY was already during the first world war in decypher section of the Austro-Hungarian army. He wrote a book about this time and intended to publish it, but it was forbidden by the German Government).

General Major v. IETRIKOVIC 1938/1939 - 1945.

In the Hungarian section only officers were occupied as decyphers, whereas in the German Chi-section of the OKW only officials and employees were occupied with the decyphering of foreign systems.

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